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VERY PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE
Comments welcome
Abstract
This paper builds a framework for the analysis of macroeconomic business cycles that in-
corporates the endogenous determination of the number of producers over the business cycle.
Economic expansions induce higher entry rates by prospective entrants subject to irreversible
investment costs. The sluggish response of the number of producers (due to the sunk entry
costs) generates a new and potentially important endogenous propagation mechanism for real
business cycle models (which typically rely on the accumulation of physical capital by a ﬁxed
number of producers). Consistent with the data, our framework predicts a procyclical number
of producers, and procyclical proﬁt s . W eu s et h es a m em o d e l i n gf r a m e w o r kt oa n a l y z eh o w
endogenous entry aﬀects the eﬃciency properties of business cycle models. We show that the
market equilibrium of our model is eﬃcient, even with prices above marginal costs, if labor
supply is inelastic. When labor supply is endogenous, eﬃciency is restored by taxing leisure at
a rate equal to the net markup in the market for consumption goods.
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The number of ﬁrms in the economy varies over the business cycle. Figure 1 shows the quarterly
g r o w t hr a t e so fr e a lG D P ,p r o ﬁts, and net entry in the U.S. economy (measured as the diﬀerence
between new incorporations and failures) for the period 1947-1998. Net entry is strongly procyclical
and comoves with real proﬁts, which are also procyclical. Figure 2 shows cross correlations between
real GDP, proﬁts, and net entry (Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered data in logs) at various leads and lags,
with 95 percent conﬁdence bands. The strong procyclicality of net entry and proﬁts is evident,
with net entry strongly correlated to proﬁts. Importantly, Figure 2 shows that net entry tends to
lead GDP and proﬁt expansions, suggesting that ﬁrm entry in the expectation of future proﬁts may
play an important role in GDP expansions.1
This paper studies the role of ﬁrm entry in propagating business cycle ﬂuctuations in a model
with monopolistic competition and sunk entry costs. We seek to understand the contributions
of the intensive and extensive margins to the response of the economy to changes in aggregate
productivity, government spending, and market regulation (which aﬀects the size of sunk entry
costs). We also explore the consequences of introducing free entry for eﬃciency of the equilibrium
of the economy.
In our setup, each individual ﬁrm produces using only labor. However, the number of ﬁrms that
produce in each period can be interpreted as the capital stock of the economy, and the decision
of households to ﬁnance entry of new ﬁrms is akin to the decision to accumulate physical capital
in the standard real business cycle (RBC) model. In fact, we show that our model relates quite
transparently to the traditional RBC model as laid out, for instance, in Campbell (1994).
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences though. We show that ﬁrm entry plays an important role in
the propagation of responses to shocks. We start from a benchmark version of the model with
inelastic labor supply. If aggregate productivity increases permanently, the expansion of aggregate
GDP initially takes place at the intensive margin, with an increase in output of existing ﬁrms.
Higher productivity makes entry more attractive and labor is reallocated to creation of new ﬁrms.
Over time, the number of ﬁrms in the economy increases, and output per ﬁrm decreases. Further
aggregate GDP expansion is the result of an increasing number of producers. In the long run,
output per ﬁrm returns to the initial steady-state level and permanent GDP expansion is entirely
driven by the extensive margin. These labor reallocation dynamics and intensive-extensive margin
1The procyclical pattern of net entry is the result of a strongly procyclical pattern of new incorporations and a
countercyclical pattern of failures, which correlate negatively with GDP and proﬁts.
1eﬀects are absent in the standard RBC framework. Importantly, even if total labor supply is ﬁxed,
and hence net job creation is absent, our model predicts sizeable gross job ﬂows, precisely due to
intersectoral reallocations.
We then introduce an endogenous labor supply decision and show that this further enhances
the propagation mechanism of our model. In general, adjustment along this margin (total hours
worked) ampliﬁes the eﬀects of shocks. Importantly, we show that government spending shocks
have very diﬀerent eﬀects depending on whether labor supply is ﬁxed or elastic enough. In the latter
case, wasteful government spending can in fact increase private consumption, with a positive eﬀect
on welfare. In summary, we show that ﬁrm entry strengthens the notoriously weak endogenous
propagation mechanism of business cycle models (see Cogley and Nason, 1995) and contributes
signiﬁcantly to both persistence and volatility of economic ﬂuctuations.
The normative implications of our exercise are also signiﬁcant. Importantly, despite prices being
above marginal cost, the market equilibrium of our model with entry is eﬃcient if labor supply is
inelastic. We identify two mechanisms that ensure this result. First, since price adjustment is
frictionless and producers are symmetric, markups in the pricing of all goods that bring utility to
the consumer are synchronized. While this is also true in a model with monopolistic competition
and a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms when labor supply is inelastic, our model with entry has an important
additional implication. Namely, although we let one factor of production (the number of ﬁrms)
vary subject to a sunk entry cost, a time-to-build lag, and exogenous ﬁrm destruction, eﬃciency
still holds. The resulting number of ﬁrms is socially optimal due to the key distinguishing feature
of our framework — the entry mechanism based on C.E.S. preferences, as we explain below.2
Eﬃciency no longer holds when the other factor of production in our model varies, i.e.,w h e n
labor supply is endogenous. However, the relevant distortion is not the existence of a markup
in the market for goods, but heterogeneity in markups between the “goods” the consumer cares
about: consumption goods and leisure (priced at “marginal cost” in a competitive labor market).
If the government taxes leisure (or subsidizes labor supply) at a rate equal to the net markup in
consumption goods prices, eﬃciency is restored. While these results hold also in a model with a
ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, an equivalent optimal policy in that setup would have the markup removed
by a distortionary tax on revenues. In our model, such a policy of inducing marginal cost pricing
would eliminate entry incentives, since the sunk entry cost could not be covered in the absence
2Feenstra (2003) observes that a constant number of ﬁrms “violates the spirit of monopolistic competition.”
2of proﬁts.3 This shows that, in the presence of entry subject to a sunk cost, monopoly power is
not a distortion and should in fact be preserved. Indeed, while markup synchronization is still
a necessary condition for eﬃciency, suﬃciency requires that markups be aligned to the relatively
higher level.
[TO BE INCLUDED: SECOND-MOMENT PROPERTIES.]
Our paper contributes to several literatures. Chatterjee and Cooper (1993) and Devereux,
Head, and Lapham (1996a,b) documented the procyclical nature of entry and developed general
equilibrium models with monopolistic competition to study the eﬀect of entry and exit on the
dynamics of the business cycle. However, entry is frictionless in their models: There is no sunk
entry cost, and ﬁrms enter instantaneously in each period until all proﬁt opportunities are exploited.
A ﬁxed period-by-period cost then merely ensures that the number of operating ﬁrms is ﬁnite; the
free-entry condition sets proﬁts to zero in all periods, and the number of ﬁrms that produce in each
period is not a state variable. This is clearly inconsistent with two pieces of evidence presented
above, namely the cyclical variation of proﬁts (Figure 1) and the fact that net entry leads both
output and proﬁts (Figure 2). Moreover, this is also inconsistent with observed barriers to entry in
most industries. In contrast, entry in our model is subject to a sunk entry cost and a time-to-build
lag, so the free entry condition equates the expected present discounted value of proﬁts to the
sunk cost. Therefore, proﬁts are allowed to vary and the number of ﬁr m si sas t a t ev a r i a b l ei no u r
model, consistently with the evidence presented above and the widespread view that the number
of producing ﬁrms is ﬁxed in the short run.4 Furthermore, Devereux, Head, and Lapham interpret
the number of ﬁrms as an endogenous productivity shifter, whereas it is best interpreted as the
capital stock of the economy in our model.5
By studying the eﬃciency properties of the model in dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium
(DSGE), our work contributes also to the literature on the eﬃciency properties of monopolistic
competition started by the original work of Lerner (1934) and developed by Samuelson (1947),
Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and Grossman and Helpman (1991), among others.6
3We are implicitly assuming that the government is not contemporaneously subsidizing the entire amount of the
entry cost.
4I nf a c t ,o u rm o d e lf e a t u r e saﬁxed number of producing ﬁrms within each period and a fully ﬂexible number of
ﬁrms in the long run.
5Benassy (1996b) analyzes the persistence properties of the model developed by Devereux, Head, and Lapham.
See also Hornstein (1993) and Kim (2004). The dynamics of ﬁrm entry and exit have recently received attention in
open economy studies. See, for instance, Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2005) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
6See also Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Benassy (1996a). Kim (2004) also studies eﬃciency in his DSGE
model with endogenous number of ﬁrms. However, the entry decision is not fully endogenous in his model, which
reduces to a one-period structure. In addition, increasing returns can generate indeterminacy in his setup, whereas
3The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model with inelastic
labor supply. Section 3 analyzes the eﬃciency properties of the model and its solution. Section 4
illustrates the dynamic properties of the model for transmission of economic ﬂuctuations by means
of a numerical example. Section 5 extends the model to allow for endogenous labor supply. Section
6 completes the discussion of Section 4 by discussing impulse responses to exogenous shocks for
diﬀerent values of labor supply elasticity. [TO BE COMPLETED.]
2 The Benchmark Model
Household Preferences and the Intratemporal Consumption Choice
The economy is populated by a unit mass of atomistic households. All contracts and prices are
w r i t t e ni nn o m i n a lt e r m s . P r i c e sa r eﬂexible. Thus, we only solve for the real variables in the
model. However, as the composition of the consumption basket changes over time due to ﬁrm
entry (aﬀecting the deﬁnition of the consumption-based price index), we introduce money as a
convenient unit of account for contracts. Money plays no other role in the economy. For this
reason, we do not model the demand for cash currency, and resort to a cashless economy as in
Woodford (2003).
We begin by assuming that the representative household supplies L units of labor inelastically in
each period at the nominal wage rate Wt. The household maximizes expected intertemporal utility
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,w h e r eβ ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount
factor and γ>0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
At time t, the household consumes the basket of goods Ct,d e ﬁned over a continuum of
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, and the household’s demand for each individual good ω is
ct (ω)=( pt (ω)/Pt)
−θ Ct.7
the equilibrium is always locally determinate in ours.
7An alternative setup would have the household consume a homogeneous good produced by a competitive sector
that bundles intermediate goods using a production function that has the form of our consumption basket. All
our results would hold also in that setup, though the interpretation would be diﬀerent. In our setup, consumers
derive welfare directly from availability of more varieties. In the alternative setup, an increased range of intermediate
goods shows up as increasing returns to specialization. Empirical problems associated with increasing returns to
specialization and a C.E.S. production function induce us to adopt the speciﬁcation without intermediate varieties.
4The Government






. Government demand for each good is then gt (ω)=
(pt (ω)/Pt)
−θ Gt. We assume that the budget is balanced in each period and all spending is ﬁ-
nanced via lump-sum taxes Tt = Gt. Aggregate government consumption Gt is exogenous and
follows an AR(1) process (in logarithms).
Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerent variety
ω ∈ Ω. Production requires only one factor, labor. Aggregate labor productivity is indexed by
Zt, which represents the eﬀectiveness of one unit of labor. Zt is exogenous and follows an AR(1)
process (in logarithms). Output supplied by ﬁrm ω is yt (ω)=Ztlt (ω),w h e r elt (ω) is the ﬁrm’s
labor demand for productive purposes. The unit cost of production, in units of the consumption
good Ct,i swt/Zt,w h e r ewt ≡ Wt/Pt is the real wage.8
Prior to entry, ﬁrms face a sunk entry cost of fE,t eﬀective labor units, equal to wtfE,t/Zt
units of the consumption good. There are no ﬁxed production costs. Hence, all ﬁrms that enter
the economy produce in every period, until they are hit with a “death” shock, which occurs with
probability δ ∈ (0,1) in every period.9
Given our modeling assumption relating each ﬁrm to an individual variety, we think of a ﬁrm as
a production line for that variety, and the entry cost as the development and setup cost associated
with the latter (potentially inﬂuenced by market regulation). The exogenous “death” shock also
takes place at the individual variety level. Empirically, a ﬁrm may comprise more than one of these
production lines. Our model does not address the determination of product variety within ﬁrms,
but our main results would be unaﬀected by the introduction of multi-product ﬁrms.
Firms set prices in a ﬂexible fashion as constant markups over marginal costs. In units of
consumption, ﬁrm ω’s price is ρt (ω) ≡ pt (ω)/Pt =[ θ/(θ − 1)]wt/Zt.T h eﬁrm’s proﬁt in units of
consumption, returned to households as dividend, is dt (ω)=ρt (ω)
1−θ (Ct + Gt)/θ.
8Consistent with standard RBC theory, aggregate productivity Zt aﬀects all ﬁrms uniformly. We abstract from
the more complex technology diﬀusion processes across ﬁrms of diﬀerent vintages studied by Caballero and Hammour
(1994) and Campbell (1998). We also do not address the growth eﬀects of changes in product variety. Bils and
Klenow (2001) document that these eﬀects are empirically relevant for the U.S.
9For simplicity, we do not consider endogenous exit in this paper. Appropriate calibration of δ makes it possible
for our model to match several important features of the data.
5Firm Entry and Exit
In every period, there is a mass Nt of ﬁrms producing in the economy and an unbounded mass
of prospective entrants. These entrants are forward looking, and correctly anticipate their future
expected proﬁts ds (ω) in every period s ≥ t +1as well as the probability δ (in every period) of
incurring the exit-inducing shock. Entrants at time t only start producing at time t +1 ,w h i c h
introduces a one-period time-to-build lag in the model. The exogenous exit shock occurs at the
very end of the time period (after production and entry). A proportion δ of new entrants will
therefore never produce. Prospective entrants in period t compute their expected post-entry value












This also represents the value of incumbent ﬁrms after production has occurred (since both new
entrants and incumbents then face the same probability 1 − δ of survival and production in the
subsequent period). Entry occurs until ﬁrm value is equalized with the entry cost, leading to the
free entry condition vt (ω)=wtfE,t/Zt. This condition holds so long as the mass NE,t of entrants
is positive. We assume that macroeconomic shocks are small enough for this condition to hold
in every period. Finally, the timing of entry and production we have assumed implies that the
number of producing ﬁrms during period t is given by Nt =( 1− δ)(Nt−1 + NE,t−1).T h en u m b e r
of producing ﬁrms represents the stock of capital of the economy. It is an endogenous state variable
that behaves much like physical capital in the benchmark RBC model.
Symmetric Firm Equilibrium
All ﬁrms face the same marginal cost. Hence, equilibrium prices, quantities, and ﬁrm values are
identical across ﬁrms: pt (ω)=pt, ρt (ω)=ρt, lt (ω)=lt, yt (ω)=yt, dt (ω)=dt, vt (ω)=vt.
In turn, equality of prices across ﬁrms implies that the consumption-based price index Pt and the
ﬁrm-level price pt are such that Pt =( Nt)
1
1−θ pt,o rρt = pt/Pt =( Nt)
1
θ−1. A ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
number of ﬁrms implies necessarily that the relative price of each individual good increases. When
there are more ﬁrms, households derive more welfare from spending a given nominal amount, i.e.,
ceteris paribus, the price index decreases. It follows that the relative price of each individual good
6must rise.10 The aggregate consumption output of the economy is Y C
t = Ntρtyt.U s i n gt h em a r k e t
clearing condition yt = ct + gt =( ρt)
−θ (Ct + Gt) and ρt =( Nt)
1
θ−1 yields Y C
t = Ct + Gt.
Household Budget Constraint andI n t e r t e m p o r a lD e c i s i o n s
Households hold two types of assets: shares in a mutual fund of ﬁrms and risk-free bonds. (We
assume that bonds pay risk-free, consumption-based real returns.) Let xt be the share in the mutual
fund of ﬁrms held by the representative household entering period t. The mutual fund pays a total
proﬁt in each period (in units of currency) equal to the total proﬁto fa l lﬁrms that produce in
that period, PtNtdt.D u r i n g p e r i o dt, the representative household buys xt+1 shares in a mutual
fund of NH,t ≡ Nt + NE,t ﬁrms (those already operating at time t and the new entrants). Only
Nt+1 =( 1− δ)NH,t ﬁrms will produce and pay dividends at time t +1 . Since the household does
not know which ﬁr m sw i l lb eh i tb yt h ee x o g e n o u se x i ts h o c kδ at the very end of period t,i t
ﬁnances the continuing operation of all pre-existing ﬁrms and all new entrants during period t.T h e
date t price (in units of currency) of a claim to the future proﬁt stream of the mutual fund of NH,t
ﬁrms is equal to the nominal price of claims to future ﬁrm proﬁts, Ptvt.
The household enters period t with bond holdings Bt in units of consumption and mutual
fund share holdings xt. It receives gross interest income on bond holdings, dividend income on
mutual fund share holdings and the value of selling its initial share position, and labor income.
The household allocates these resources between purchases of bonds and shares to be carried into
next period, consumption, and lump-sum taxes Tt levied by the government. The period budget
constraint (in units of consumption) is:
Bt+1 + vtNH,txt+1 + Ct + Tt =( 1+rt)Bt +( dt + vt)Ntxt + wtL, (2)
where rt is the consumption-based interest rate on holdings of bonds between t − 1 and t (known
with certainty as of t − 1). The household maximizes its expected intertemporal utility subject to
(2).
The Euler equations for bond and share holdings are:
(Ct)












10In the alternative setup with homogeneous consumption produced by aggregating intermediate goods, an increase
in the number of intermediates available implies that the competitive sector producing consumption becomes more
eﬃcient, and the relative price of each individual input relative to consumption rises accordingly.
7As expected, forward iteration of the equation for share holdings and absence of speculative bubbles
yield the asset price solution in equation (1).11
Aggregate Accounting, Equilibrium, and the Labor Market
Aggregating the budget constraint (2) across households and imposing the equilibrium conditions
Bt+1 = Bt =0and xt+1 = xt =1∀t yields the aggregate accounting identity Ct + Gt + NE,tvt =
wtL+Ntdt: Total consumption (private plus public) plus investment (in new ﬁrms) must be equal
to total income (labor income plus dividend income).
Diﬀerent from the benchmark, one-sector, RBC model of Campbell (1994) and many other
studies, our model economy is a two-sector economy in which one sector employs part of the labor
endowment to produce consumption and the other sector employs the rest of the labor endowment
to produce new ﬁrms. The economy’s GDP, Yt, is equal to total income, wtL + Ntdt. In turn,
Yt is also the total output of the economy, given by consumption output, Y C
t (= Ct + Gt),p l u s
investment output, NE,tvt. With this in mind, vt is the relative price of the investment “good” in
terms of consumption.
Labor market equilibrium requires that the total amount of labor used in production and to
set up the new entrants’ plants must equal aggregate labor supply: LC
t + LE
t = L,w h e r eLC
t =
Ntlt = Nt (ρt)
−θ (Ct + Gt)/Zt is the total amount of labor used in production of consumption, and
LE
t = NE,tfE,t/Zt is labor used to build new ﬁrms.12 In the benchmark RBC model, physical capital
is accumulated by using as investment part of the output of the same good used for consumption.
In other words, all labor is allocated to the only productive sector of the economy. When labor
supply is ﬁxed, there are no labor market dynamics in the model, other than the determination of
the equilibrium wage along a vertical supply curve. In our model, even when labor supply is ﬁxed,
labor market dynamics arise in the allocation of labor between production of consumption and
creation of new plants. The allocation is determined jointly by the entry decision of prospective
entrants and the portfolio decision of households who ﬁnance that entry. The value of ﬁrms, or
the relative price of investment in terms of consumption vt, plays a crucial role in determining this
allocation.13
11We omit the transversality conditions for bonds and shares that must be satisﬁed to ensure optimality. Note
that the interest rate is determined residually in our economy (it appears only in the Euler equation for bonds and
is fully determined once consumption is determined). This is due to the absence of physical capital. Indeed, what is
crucial in our economy for the allocation of intertemporal consumption is the return on shares.
12We used the equilibrium condition yt = Ztlt = ct + gt =( ρt)
−θ (Ct + Gt) in the expression for L
C
t .
13When labor supply is elastic, labor market dynamics operate along two margins as the interaction of household
and entry decisions determines jointly the total amount of labor and its allocation to the two sectors of the economy.
8Aggregate Production and the Role of Variety
Rearranging the labor market clearing condition and using ρt =( Nt)
1
θ−1 yields the following ex-
pression for aggregate production of the consumption good:
Y C
t = Ct + Gt =( Nt)
1
θ−1 (ZtL − fE,tNE,t).














These expressions resemble analogous expressions in Chatterjee and Cooper (1993) and Devereux,
Head, and Lapham (1996a,b). An increase in the number of entrants NE,t absorbs productive
resources in the form of eﬀective labor and acts like an overhead cost. This cost is accounted for
diﬀerently in GDP, since this recognizes that ﬁrm entry is productive. Ceteris paribus,w h e nθ goes
to inﬁnity (goods are perfect substitutes), the expression for Yt reduces to a familiar Cobb-Douglas
production function with a zero share of capital: Yt = ZtL.
Chatterjee and Cooper (1993) and Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996a,b) interpret the eﬀect
of changes in the number of active ﬁrms Nt in the expressions above as an endogenous aggregate
productivity shifter. Since θ>1, an increase in the number of active ﬁrms Nt has a similar eﬀect
to that of an endogenous increase in productivity. As there is no sunk entry cost nor time-to-build
lag in those studies, such endogenous productivity changes do not impart endogenous persistence
in those models, in contrast to ours. If we think of the eﬀect of entry as endogenously aﬀecting
productivity in our model, entry at time t aﬀects labor demand at t+1 becauseitaﬀects productivity
of labor at t +1by causing Nt+1 to rise.
We prefer to interpret Nt as the stock of capital (production lines) of the economy during
period t, treating aggregate productivity Zt as exogenous in production of the consumption good,
Y C
t = ZtρtNtlt, and in production of new plants. There are two reasons for this. First, it is
transparent to treat labor per ﬁrm and the number of ﬁrms as the factors of production in the
aggregate function Y C
t = ZtρtNtlt,i nw h i c hZt is exogenous productivity, and the relative price
ρt converts units of individual goods into units of consumption. In this interpretation, which does
not hinge on the properties of C.E.S. demand to endogenize productivity relative to the number of
ﬁrms, entry at t aﬀects labor demand at t +1because it increases the number of producing ﬁrms
9at t+1. This is akin to the benchmark RBC model, where investment at t aﬀects labor demand at
t+1by increasing the capital stock used in production at t+1. Second, as argued in Ghironi and
Melitz (2005), empirically relevant variables — as opposed to welfare-consistent concepts — net out
the eﬀect of changes in the range of available varieties. The reason is that construction of CPI data
by statistical agencies does not adjust for availability of new varieties as in the welfare-consistent
price index.14 CPI data are closer to pt than Pt. For this reason, when investigating the properties
of the model in relation to the data (for instance, when computing second moments or impulse
responses for comparison with empirical evidence), one wants to focus on real variables deﬂated
by a data-consistent price index. For any variable Xt in units of the consumption basket, such
data-consistent counterpart is obtained as XR,t ≡ PtXt/pt = Xt/ρt = Xt/(Nt)
1
θ−1. Therefore,
data-consistent measures of consumption output and GDP in our model are Y C
R,t = ZtL−fE,tNE,t
and YR,t = ZtL − 1
θfE,tNE,t, which remove the role of variety as an endogenous productivity
shifter.15
Model Summary
Table 1 summarizes the main equilibrium conditions of the model. The equations in the table
constitute a system of eight equations in eight endogenous variables: ρt,d t,w t,N E,t,N t,r t,v t,
Ct. Of these endogenous variables, two are predetermined as of time t: the total number of ﬁrms,
Nt, and the risk-free interest rate, rt. Additionally, the model features three exogenous variables:
government spending Gt, aggregate productivity Zt, and the sunk entry cost fE,t. The latter may
be interpreted in at least two ways. Part of the sunk entry cost fE,t originates in the economy’s
technology for creation of new plants, which is exogenous and outside the control of policymakers.
But another part of the entry cost is motivated by regulation and entry barriers induced by policy.
Holding the technology component of fE,t given, we interpret changes in fE,t below as changes in
market regulation facing ﬁrms.
3 Benchmark Model Properties and Solution
We can reduce the system in Table 1 to a system of two equations in two variables, Nt and Ct.
To see this, write ﬁrm value as a function of the endogenous state Nt and the exogenous state
14Adjustment for variety, when it happens, certainly does not happen at the frequency represented by periods in
our model.
15Treating aggregate productivity as exogenous in the absence of ﬁrm heterogeneity and endogenous exit is also
consistent with Melitz (2003).







θ−1 .( 3 )
Equation (3) and the free entry condition in Table 1 yield a ﬁrst, important set of results: Since the
number of producing ﬁrms is predetermined and does not react to exogenous shocks on impact, ﬁrm
value and the real wage are also predetermined with respect to some exogenous shocks. Namely,
ﬁrm value is predetermined with respect to all shocks but deregulation, while the real wage (wt =
[(θ − 1)/θ]Zt (Nt)
1
θ−1) is predetermined with respect to all shocks but productivity. A fall in the
sunk entry cost encourages entry and decreases ﬁrm value since more ﬁrms start producing at t+1,
which implies an expected decrease in demand for each individual ﬁrm. An increase in productivity
results in a proportional increase in the real wage on impact through its eﬀect on labor demand.
Since the entry cost is paid in eﬀective labor units, this does not aﬀect ﬁrm value. An implication
of the wage schedule wt =[ ( θ − 1)/θ]Zt (Nt)
1
θ−1 is also that marginal cost, wt/Zt, is predetermined
with respect to all shocks.
The number of new entrants as a function of consumption and number of ﬁrms is NE,t =
ZtL/fE,t − (Nt)
1
1−θ (Ct + Gt)/fE,t. Substituting this, equation (3), and the expression for proﬁts
(dt =( Ct + Gt)/(θNt))i nt h el a wo fm o t i o nf o rNt and the Euler equation for shares yields:





























Equation (4) implies that the eﬀect of shocks to the exogenous labor supply (if we allowed it to be
time-varying) would be identical to that of productivity shocks — except for the real wage, as we
explain below. For this reason, we do not consider the case of exogenously varying L.
Eﬃciency
We now prove that the market equilibrium of our benchmark model with ﬁxed labor supply coincides
with the solution of the problem that a social planner would solve to allocate resources optimally,
16The same relation can be obtained by using the equilibrium price index equation ρt =( Nt)
1
θ−1 in conjunction
with pricing and the free entry condition. Then one can back out the expression for the number of entrants from
labor market clearing or from the aggregate accounting equation and Ct + Gt = Ntρtyt = Nt (ρt)
1−θ (Ct + Gt).I t
follows that, consistent with Walras’ Law, labor market clearing — or aggregate accounting — is redundant if we include
ρt =( Nt)
1
θ−1 i nt h es y s t e mt ob es o l v e d .
11guaranteeing eﬃciency of the market equilibrium.17
To solve for the planning optimum, we must write the problem in terms of quantities only. The
simplest way is to think of the planner as choosing the amount of labor to be allocated to the sector
producing consumption. Since the planner will allocate labor identically across symmetric ﬁrms,
labor allocated to production of consumption is LC
t ≡ Ntlt. The rest of the labor endowment of the
representative household, L − LC
t = LE
t , will then be allocated to the investment sector, covering
the sunk entry cost for creation of new ﬁrms. For the purposes of this sub-section, we abstract
from government spending, so that Ct = Y C
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As we show in the appendix, the ﬁrst-order condition for the planner’s optimal choice of LC
t is
identical to equation (5). The constraints (6)-(8) can be consolidated into an equation identical to
(4) — scrolled forward one period. Hence, the solution of the planner’s problem coincides with the
competitive equilibrium of the model, ensuring eﬃciency of the latter.18
This result stems from two features of our model economy: synchronization of markups and
the entry mechanism under C.E.S. preferences, the role of which we shall now explain in detail.19
The ﬁrst piece of intuition, which we will refer to as “the Lerner-Samuelson intuition,” concerns
the synchronization of markups. Lerner (1934, p. 172) ﬁrst noted that the allocation of resources
is eﬃcient when markups are equal in the pricing of all goods: “The conditions for that optimum
distribution of resources between diﬀerent commodities that we designate the absence of monopoly
are satisﬁed if prices are all proportional to marginal cost.” Samuelson (1947, p. 239-240) also
makes this point clearly: “If all factors of production were indiﬀerent between diﬀerent uses and
completely ﬁxed in amount — the pure Austrian case —, then [...] proportionality of prices and
marginal cost would be suﬃcient.” This makes it clear that equality of prices to marginal cost
is not necessary for achieving an optimal allocation, contrary to an argument often found in the
17In this subsection, we treat the sunk entry cost fE,t as a structural feature of the economy, akin to a characteristic
of the production function, rather than as an instrument of policy that the planner may manipulate through regulation
or deregulation.
18It is easy to verify that this result holds for a general period utility function U(C) that has the standard properties.
19Our analysis below echoes points made by Grossman and Helpman (1991).
12macroeconomic policy literature. This point is equally true in a model with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms
N, where the planner merely solves a static allocation problem, allocating labor to the symmetric
individual goods evenly.20
Our model has the important, additional property that the market allocation is eﬃcient even
when a dynamic allocation problem is solved under free entry subject to a sunk cost, a time-to-build
lag, and exogenous exit. This is important because it implies that the allocation of labor to the two
sectors of our economy is eﬃcient, and it contradicts Samuelson’s further claim that “If we drop
these highly special assumptions [that factors of production are ﬁxed —...], we should not have an
optimum situation” (op. cit., p. 240). We let one factor of production (the number of ﬁrms, or the
stock of production lines) vary and show that the market equilibrium is still eﬃcient since all the
new ﬁrms charge the same markup.21 This brings us to the second feature of our economy that
ensures eﬃciency.
Despite synchronized markups, entry could lead to ineﬃciency due to two other possible dis-
tortions — if new entrants ignore on the one hand the positive eﬀect of a new variety on consumer
surplus and on the other the negative eﬀect on other ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Grossman and Helpman (1991)
call these distortions the “consumer surplus eﬀect“ and the “proﬁt destruction eﬀect,” respectively.
With C.E.S. preferences, these two contrasting forces perfectly balance each other and the result-
ing equilibrium is eﬃcient. However, when preferences do not take the C.E.S, ineﬃciency may
arise.22 We provide an example of this by considering a speciﬁcation of consumption preferences
that separates the degree of monopoly power from the consumer’s taste for variety in an ad hoc
fashion as, e.g., in Benassy (1996a). In that case (explored in an appendix), the economy ends up
with a suboptimally low (high) number of producing ﬁrms if the parameter governing the taste for
variety is lower (higher) than the degree of monopoly power (the net price markup). Nevertheless,
this preference speciﬁcation implies that the consumer derives utility from goods that (s)he never
consumes, and similarly is worse oﬀ when a good disappears even if consumption of that good was
zero. This unappealing feature clearly drives the welfare conclusions, and induces us to adopt the
C.E.S. speciﬁcation in which when a good is produced, it will expand variety and hence increase
utility only if it is consumed.
We have established that the competitive equilibrium of our benchmark model with ﬁxed labor
20Notice, though, that the equilibrium of our model would be ineﬃcient if, for some reason, the number of ﬁrms
were ﬁxed because agents are prevented from accessing the available technology for creation of new ﬁrms. Ineﬃciency
would arise because the number of ﬁrms would be suboptimal.
21This result, however, does not hold if we relax the ﬁxed-labor assumption, as shown in Section 5.
22See also Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Judd (1985) for a discussion of these issues.
13is eﬃcient and explained this result based on synchronization of markups and the entry mechanism
under C.E.S. preferences. As should be intuitive by now, eﬃciency breaks down when there are
diﬀerences in markups across ﬁrms or sectors of the economy, as is the case when ﬁrms are het-
erogenous and/or price adjustment is not synchronized.23 Moreover, as we show below, eﬃciency
fails when labor supply is endogenous. But we shall argue that this ineﬃciency is induced by the
absence of a markup in the pricing of leisure, and not by monopoly power (generating a markup
in the consumption production sector). Indeed, we will argue that monopoly power should not be
removed, since proﬁt incentives are the driving force behind entry and production in our economy.
Instead, a simple policy of subsidizing labor income can be designed that restores eﬃciency by
eﬀectively equalizing markups for all the goods the household cares about (including leisure).
The Steady State
Having established eﬃciency of the equilibrium of our benchmark model, we now turn to its solution,
starting from the long-run equilibrium.
We assume that exogenous variables are constant in steady state and denote steady-state levels
of variables by dropping the time subscript: Gt = G, Zt = Z,a n dfE,t = fE. All endogenous
variables are constant in steady state.
The steady-state interest rate is pinned downa su s u a lb yt h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e ,1+r = β−1;
the gross return on shares is 1+d/v =( 1+r)/(1 − δ), which captures a premium for expected
ﬁrm destruction. The number of new entrants makes up for the exogenous destruction of existing
ﬁrms: NE = δN/(1 − δ). We follow Campbell (1994) below and exploit 1+r = β−1 to treat r as
a parameter in the solution.
Calculating the shares of proﬁt income and investment in consumption output and GDP allows
us to draw another transparent comparison between our model and the standard RBC setup. The
steady-state proﬁt equation gives the share of proﬁt income in consumption output: dN/Y C =1 /θ.







This expression is similar to its RBC counterpart. There, the share of investment in output is
23For instance, the welfare costs of inﬂation in modern monetary policy analysis relying on staggered price ad-
justment (e.g. Woodford, 2003) can easily be explained in terms of the Lerner-Samuelson intuition. Imperfect price
adjustment implies that ex-post markups are diﬀerent across ﬁrms, and hence there is dispersion in relative prices.
We explore the implications of imperfect price adjustment in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2005).
14given by sKδ/(r + δ), where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and sK is the share of cap-
ital income in total income. In our framework, 1/θ can be regarded as governing the share
of “capital” since it dictates the degree of monopoly power and hence the share of proﬁts that
ﬁrms generate from producing consumption output (dN/Y C). Noting that Y = Y C+ vNE,t h e
shares of investment and proﬁt income in GDP are vNE/Y = δ/[δ + θ(r + δ)] and dN/Y =
(r + δ)/[δ + θ(r + δ)], respectively. It follows that the share of private consumption in GDP is
C/Y =( 1− Γ)θ(r + δ)/[δ + θ(r + δ)],w h e r eΓ is the share of government consumption in total
consumption output Γ ≡ G/Y C and is taken here as a parameter. The share of labor income in
total income is wL/Y =1− (r + δ)/[δ + θ(r + δ)]. Importantly, all these ratios are independent
of the amount of labor L and are constant (which would hold also along a balanced growth path if
we incorporated exogenous productivity growth) as consistent with the Kaldorian growth facts.24








































fE − G. (11)
An increase in long-run productivity results in a larger number of ﬁrms, higher ﬁrm value, and
higher consumption. Deregulation (a lower sunk entry cost) generates an increase in the long-run
number of ﬁrms and consumption, and it increases ﬁrm value as a proportion of the sunk cost
itself (v/fE). The eﬀect of deregulation on v depends on whether θ is larger or smaller than two.
Empirically plausible values of θ, which satisfy θ>2, imply that deregulation has a negative eﬀect
on ﬁrm value. Government spending crowds out private consumption completely and has no eﬀect
on the economy. This is not surprising since, when labor supply is inelastic, the wealth eﬀect of
taxation on labor supply, which is central to ﬁscal policy transmission in the standard RBC model
with endogenous labor supply, is absent.
Importantly, v, C+G,a n dN all tend to zero if θ tends to inﬁnite. For ﬁrms to ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to enter, the expected present discounted value of the future proﬁts t r e a mm u s tb ep o s i t i v e ,s oa s
24Note that all ratios calculated above are identical if we compute them in terms of empirically relevant variables
deﬂated by the average price pt.
15to oﬀset the sunk entry cost. But proﬁts tend to zero in all periods if ﬁrms have no monopoly
power. This implies that no ﬁrm will enter the economy, driving N and C + G to zero.





















Both higher productivity and deregulation result in a higher wage, as a larger number of ﬁrms
puts pressure on labor demand. Most importantly, deregulation and higher productivity cause
steady-state marginal cost w/Z to increase (the long-run elasticity being 1/(θ − 1)). This is in
sharp contrast to models with a constant number of ﬁrms, where marginal cost would be constant
relative to long-run changes in productivity. To see this, set N =1for convenience and note that
w/Z =( θ − 1)/θ in this case. Changes in productivity would be reﬂected in equal percentage
changes in the real wage, so that marginal cost remains constant.25 In a model with endogenous
number of ﬁrms, higher productivity results in a more attractive business environment, which leads
to more entry and a larger number of ﬁrms. This puts pressure on labor demand that causes
w to increase by more than Z, so that the new long-run marginal cost is higher than the original
one.26 Entry is also crucial for the result that long-run consumption rises by more than a permanent
increase in productivity in our model, the long-run elasticity being θ/(θ − 1). Again, this is diﬀerent
from what would happen if we had a constant number of ﬁrms. With Nt =1 , aggregate accounting
would reduce to Ct + Gt = wtL + dt.S i n c e dt =( Ct + Gt)/θ in the absence of entry, it would
be Ct = ZtL − Gt, and consumption would increase by the same amount as productivity in all
periods.27
Given solutions for v, C, N,a n dw/Z, it is easy to recover solutions for all other variables in
Table 1, which we omit. To complete the information on the steady-state properties of the model,
Table 2 reports the long-run elasticities of endogenous variables to permanent changes in Z, fE,
and Γ.
25In fact, marginal cost (wt/Zt =[ ( θ − 1)/θ](Nt)
1
θ−1) would be constant in all periods, in and out of the steady
state, if the number of ﬁrms were constant — and Nt =1would imply ρt =1 ,a si ns t a n d a r dm o d e l sw i t h o u te n t r y .
In our model, it is the data-consistent measure of marginal cost wR,t/Zt =( wt/Zt)/ρt that is constant, while the
welfare-consistent marginal cost moves in response to changes in the number of producing ﬁrms.
26This mechanism is central for Ghironi and Melitz’s (2005) result that a permanent increase in productivity
results in higher average prices and an appreciated real exchange rate in the country that experiences such higher
productivity relative to its trading partners.
27Of course, the results for the model with Nt =1are over-simpliﬁed as a consequence of the assumptions that
labor is exogenous and production does not require capital, which imply that aggregate output is exogenous and
determined by productivity. Nevertheless, the comparison is instructive to highlight the striking consequences of
introducing entry in the model.
16Dynamics
W es o l v ef o rt h ed y n a m i c si nr e s p o n s et oe x o g e n o us shocks by log-linearizing the model around
the steady state obtained above. For simplicity, we assume L =1and initial steady-state levels of
productivity and sunk cost Z = fE =1 .W ea l s os e tG =0(or a zero share of government spending
in total consumption output, Γ). To have a system that can be written in the standard canonical
form for application of Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) results, it is convenient to scroll the state
equation (4) forward by one period, keeping in mind that Nt+1 is predetermined. Using sans-serif
fonts to denote percent deviations from steady-state levels (with the exception of Gt, which we
deﬁne as Gt ≡ dGt/C), log-linearization under assumptions of log-normality and homoskedasticity
yields:
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Equation (12) states that the number of ﬁrms producing at t+1increases if consumption at time t is
lower (households save more in the form of new ﬁrms), if the sunk entry cost is below the initial level,
or if productivity is higher. An increase in government consumption for given private consumption
absorbs resources that would otherwise be invested in ﬁrm creation, and thus causes Nt+1 to
decrease. Equation (13) states that consumption at time t is higher the higher expected future
consumption (if γ ≥ 1) and the larger the number of ﬁrms producing at time t. Current deregulation
lowers current consumption, because households save more to ﬁnance faster ﬁrm entry. However,
expected future deregulation boosts current consumption as households anticipate the availability
of more varieties in the future. The expectation of higher future government spending lowers
consumption today as households anticipate the negative eﬀect of future government consumption
on ﬁrm entry and private consumption in the future. The eﬀect of Nt+1 depends on parameter
values. For realistic values of θ, β,a n dδ,w eh a v eθ/(θ − 1) > (1 + r)/(1 − δ). It follows that
increases in the number of ﬁrms producing at t +1are associated with lower consumption at
t. (Higher productivity at time t lowers contemporaneous consumption through this channel, as
households save to ﬁnance faster entry in a more attractive economy. However, we shall see below
that the general equilibrium eﬀect of higher productivity will be that consumption rises.)
17We show in the appendix that the system (12)-(13) has a unique, non-explosive solution. To
solve the system, we assume Zt = φZZt−1 + εZ,t,w h e r eεZ,t is an i.i.d., Normal innovation with
zero mean and variance σ2
εZ. A similar process Gt = φGGt−1 + εG,t governs the dynamics of
government spending. Diﬀerently from productivity and government spending, we do not treat fE,t
as a stochastic process subject to random innovations at business cycle frequency. We think of
changes in sunk entry costs as changes in market regulation, and we assume that market regulation
is controlled by a policymaker, who can change it in more or less persistent fashion, so that fE,t =
φfEfE,t−1 in all periods after an initial change. Subject to these assumptions, the unique solution
to the system (12)-(13) takes the form:
Nt+1 = ηNNNt + ηNZZt + ηNfEfE,t + ηNGGt,
Ct = ηCNNt + ηCZZt + ηCfEfE,t + ηCGGt.
where the η’s are elasticities that we can obtain with the method of undetermined coeﬃcients
as in Campbell (1994). Table 3 summarizes the results, in a convenient order. The elasticity of
the number of ﬁrms producing in period t +1to its past level (ηNN) is such that 0 <η NN <
1.28 It follows from the expression of ηCN in Table 3 that consumption is higher the larger the
number of ﬁrms producing in period t. Plausible parameter values imply 0 <η CZ < 1 and
ηNZ > 0: Consumption increases if productivity rises, as households have more resources to spend
on consumption. However, the impact elasticity of consumption to productivity is smaller than
one as households ﬁnd it optimal to save part of the productivity gain in the form of more ﬁrms.
The same plausible parameter values imply 0 <η CfE < 1 and ηNfE > 0: Deregulation lowers
consumption on impact. As in the case of higher productivity, more ﬁrms enter the economy, but
these ﬁrms are not more productive in the deregulation scenario. Thus, consumption must decrease
to ﬁnance the entry of new ﬁrms. Government consumption crowds out private consumption:
ηCG < 0 for plausible parametrizations. This eﬀect is stronger: (i) the more persistent is government
spending (for it is the present discounted value of future taxes that matters); and (ii) the higher is
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (the lower γ), since the consumer is then more willing
to give up present consumption and postpone it to periods when taxes are lower. Government
spending also crowds out investment in the short run (ηNG < 0). This eﬀect is weaker when
crowding out of consumption is stronger.
28See the appendix on equilibrium determinacy and non-explosiveness for details.
18Some other results are worth mentioning. First, the value of ηNN is smaller the higher the
probability of ﬁrm death δ. Intuitively, the faster ﬁrms die in the economy, the less persistent the
deviations of Nt from the steady state. Second, if φZ = φfE =1(permanent changes in productivity
and regulation), ηCZ + ηCfE =1and ηNZ + ηNfE =0 . The same is true if γ =1(logarithmic
utility) and φZ = φfE = φ (equal persistence in productivity and regulation). Third, in general,
ηCZ increases if φZ is higher and ηCfE decreases if φfE is higher. Intuitively, the more persistent a
productivity shock, the longer the amount of time during which households can enjoy higher income
and the beneﬁt of larger variety. Hence, consumption increases by more — and the number of ﬁrms
correspondingly increases by less (ηNZ decreases). Similarly, the more persistent deregulation, the
longer the horizon during which households can enjoy a larger range of varieties. This weakens
the incentive to reduce consumption today to front-load ﬁrm entry — the absolute value of ηNfE
becomes smaller. Fourth, if φG =1(permanent changes in government spending), we obtain the
same elasticities as in Table 2: Consumption is crowded out completely and the number of ﬁrms is
not inﬂuenced.29 This happens because there is no intertemporal substitution since taxation moves
to a permanently higher level on impact and labor supply is inelastic.30
The solution for other endogenous, non-predetermined variables in the model is similar to that
for Ct. For any variable xt,i ti s :
xt = ηxNNt + ηxZZt + ηxfEfE,t + ηxGGt.
Given the log-linear versions of equations in Table 1 and the solution for the elasticities in Table 2,
one can easily recover the relevant elasticities. In particular, the solution for ﬁrm value is simply
vt =[ 1 /(θ − 1)]Nt + fE,t and that for the real wage is wt =[ 1 /(θ − 1)]Nt + Zt. Marginal cost
(wt −Zt) and price (ρt — now denoting percent deviation from steady state) are predetermined and
equal to [1/(θ − 1)]Nt. As we anticipated, the elasticities of endogenous variables to changes in L
would be identical to those to Zt. The only diﬀerence would be in the response of the real wage,
which would of course be equal to the response of wt − Zt to a productivity shock.
29The elasticity of consumption is of a diﬀerent magnitude than in Table 2 ( ηCG = −1) since we are using diﬀerent
measurement units due to the simplifying assumption that Γ =0 . However, Γ/(1 − Γ)=G/C, which implies that a
permanent change in G relative to C has a proportional eﬀect on C.
30This diﬀers from the cases of productivity and deregulation, where setting persistence to one does not deliver
the long-run elasticities of Table 2, but simply delivers impact elasticities to permanent shocks. The reason is that
productivity and deregulation shocks generate intertemporal substitution since the state variable (the number of
ﬁrms) moves to the new, permanently higher level only gradually. The long-run elasticities of Table 2 take the long-
run adjustment of the number of ﬁrms into account in computing the eﬀect of the shock on consumption and other
variables.
194 Business Cycles with Firm Dynamics, Part I
In this section we explore the properties of our benchmark model by means of a numerical example.
We calibrate parameters to plausible values and compute impulse responses to productivity shocks.
(We defer the responses to deregulation and government spending shocks to Section 6 for ease
of comparison with the case of elastic labor supply.) The responses substantiate the results and
intuitions in the previous section.
Calibration
We calibrate parameters as follows. We interpret periods as quarters and set β = .99 —as t a n d a r d
choice for quarterly business cycle models — and γ =1 . We use log utility as benchmark to facilitate
comparison with the case of endogenous labor supply, where we restrict utility from consumption
to be logarithmic.31 We set the size of the exogenous ﬁrm exit shock δ = .025 to match the U.S.
empirical level of 10 percent job destruction per year.32 We use the value of θ from Bernard, Eaton,
Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and set θ =3 .8,w h i c hw a sc a l i b r a t e dt oﬁt U.S. plant and macro trade
data.33 The initial steady-state entry cost fE does not aﬀect any of the impulse responses.34 We
therefore set fE =1without loss of generality.
Impulse Responses
Figure 3 shows the responses (percent deviations from steady state) to a permanent 1 percent
increase in productivity. The number of years after the shock is on the horizontal axis. Consider ﬁrst
the long-run eﬀects in the new steady state. As was previously described, the business environment
becomes more attractive, drawing a permanently higher number of entrants, which translates into a
31The key qualitative features of the impulse responses below are unaﬀected if we set γ =2 .
32Empirically, job destruction is induced by both ﬁrm exit and contraction. In our model, the “death” shock δ
takes place at the product level. In a multi-product ﬁrm, the disappearance of a product generates job destruction
without ﬁrm exit. Since we abstract from the explicit modeling of multi-product ﬁrms, we include this portion of job
destruction in δ.A sah i g h e rδ implies less persistent dynamics, our choice of δ is also consistent with not overstating
the ability of the model to generate persistence.
33It may be argued that the value of θ results in a steady-state markup that is too high relative to the evidence.
However, it is important to observe that, in models without any ﬁxed cost, θ/(θ − 1) is a measure of both markup
over marginal cost and average cost. In our model with entry costs, free entry ensures that ﬁr m se a r nz e r op r o ﬁts
net of the entry cost. This means that ﬁrms price at average cost (inclusive of the entry cost). Thus, although
θ =3 .8 implies a fairly high markup over marginal cost, our parametrization delivers reasonable results with respect
to pricing and average costs. The main qualitative features of the impulse responses below are not aﬀected if we set
θ =6 ,r e s u l t i n gi na20 percent markup of price over marginal cost as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and several
other studies.
34The total number of ﬁrms in steady state is inversely proportional to fE —a n dt h es i z ea n dv a l u eo fa l lﬁrms are
similarly proportional to fE. Basically, changing fE amounts to changing the unit of measure for output and number
of ﬁrms.
20permanently higher number of producers. This induces marginal cost and the relative price of each
product ρ to be higher. GDP Y and consumption also rise permanently, and they do so by more
than the increase in productivity due to the expansion in the range of available varieties. Individual
ﬁrm output y is not aﬀected as the increase in the relative price oﬀsets the larger demand resulting
from higher consumption. Firm proﬁtc a nb ew r i t t e na sdt = ρtyt/θ, which implies that proﬁts and
ﬁrm value are permanently higher.
Transition dynamics highlight the role of the number of ﬁrms as the key endogenous state vari-
able in our model. Absent sunk entry costs, and the associated time-to-build lag before production
starts, the number of producing ﬁrms Nt would immediately adjust to its new steady-state level.
Sunk costs and time-to-build imply that Nt is a state variable that behaves very much like the
capital stock in the standard RBC model: The number of entrants (new production lines) NE,t
represents the consumers’ investment, which translates into increases in the stock of production
lines Nt over time. Marginal cost and the relative price ρt r e a c tt ot h es h o c kw i t hal a ga n ds t a r t
increasing only in the period after the shock as a larger number of producing ﬁrms puts pressure
on labor demand.
The responses of ﬁrm-level output and GDP highlight the diﬀerent roles of intensive and ex-
tensive margins during economic expansions in response to permanent productivity improvements.
Firm-level output booms on impact in response to larger consumption. Over time, the increase in
ρt pushes ﬁrm-level output back to the initial steady state. Since output per ﬁrm returns to the
initial steady state in the long run, the increase in productivity is oﬀset by a matching decrease in
ﬁrm-level employment as the cost of labor increases during the transition. Thus, our model predicts
that the expansionary eﬀect of higher productivity is initially transmitted through the intensive
margin as output per ﬁrm rises, but it is the extensive margin that delivers GDP expansion in the
long run. Over time, the expansion along the intensive margin is reabsorbed as the increase in the
number of ﬁrms puts pressure on labor costs, and eventually the expansion operates only through
the extensive margin.
Importantly, during the transition, there is a reallocation of the ﬁxed labor supply from produc-
tion of consumption to production of new ﬁrms, as implied by the increase in LE
t and the decrease
in LC
t . As the increase in productivity boosts entry, labor shifts to the construction of new plants.
Over time, the rising cost of eﬀective labor — and thus the rising burden of the entry cost — redis-
tributes this labor back to production of consumption. The gradual increase in the cost of eﬀective
labor explains why the number of new entrants overshoots its new long-run equilibrium in the short
21run.
The responses of several key macroeconomic variables deﬂated by average prices rather than
with the consumption based price index are qualitatively similar to those in Figure 3.35 Three
key diﬀerences are worth mentioning: Once the variety eﬀect and the implied increase in ρt are
removed, ﬁrm real proﬁts track ﬁrm output in Figure 3 and return to the original steady state in
the long run. Aggregate real proﬁts (DR,t ≡ Ntdt/ρt), however, increase in procyclical fashion,
consistent with the evidence in Figure 1. Firm value is not aﬀected at all by the shock, because
the real wage wR,t increases exactly as much as the shock.
To further illustrate the properties of our model, Figure 4 shows the responses to a 1 percent
productivity shock with persistence .9. The direction of movement of endogenous variables on
impact is the same as in Figure 3, though all variables return to the steady state in the long run.
Interestingly, ﬁrm level output is below the steady state during most of the transition, except for
a short-lived initial expansion. Diﬀerent from the permanent shock case, the relative price eﬀect
prevails on the expansion in consumption demand to push individual ﬁrm output below the steady
state for most of the transition. In contrast to a model without entry and the traditional type
of capital, the dynamics of ﬁrm entry result in responses that persist beyond the duration of the
exogenous shock and, for some key variables, display a hump-shaped pattern.
5 Endogenous Labor Supply
In this section we consider a model with endogenous labor supply. The only modiﬁcation with
respect to the model of Section 2 is that now households choose how much labor eﬀort to sup-
ply for production of the consumption good and to set up new ﬁrms. Consequently, the util-
ity function features an additional term measuring the disutility of hours worked: U (Ct,L t)=
lnCt − χ(Lt)
1+1/ϕ /(1 + 1/ϕ),w h e r eϕ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to wages, and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply. As in Campbell (1994), our choice of func-
tional form for the utility function in this case is guided by results in King, Plosser, and Rebelo
(1988): Given separable preferences, log utility from consumption ensures that income and substi-
tution eﬀects of real wage variation on eﬀort cancel out in steady state; this guarantees constant
steady-state eﬀort and balanced growth — if there is productivity growth.
35For instance, this is the case for CR,t and YR,t, even if the increase after the initial impact is muted and removal
of the variety eﬀect implies that these empirically-consistent variables do not increase by more than the size of the
shock in the new steady state.
22From inspection of Table 1, the only modiﬁcations to the existing equilibrium conditions are
that γ is set to unity and L in the aggregate accounting identity now features a time index t.T h e
new variable Lt is then determined in standard fashion by adding to the equilibrium conditions the







Combining this with the wage schedule wt =[ ( θ − 1)/θ]Zt (Nt)
1
θ−1, which holds also with endoge-









which can be solved to obtain hours worked as a function of consumption, the number of ﬁrms,













1−θ (Ct + Gt)
fE,t
.
The system (4)-(5) changes as follows. The Euler equation (5) changes only insofar as we set γ
to one. The state equation (4) is now replaced by:
















1−θ (Ct−1 + Gt−1)
#
.
Planning Optimum and Market Equilibrium

































The Euler equation for the optimal choice of Nt+1 and the law of motion for the number of ﬁrms
a r ei d e n t i c a lt ot h ec a s eo fﬁxed labor supply, except for labor being now indexed by time. The
36As before, we omit government spending from the planner’s problem to simplify notation, and it is easy to verify
that the results on eﬃciency hold for a general period utility function U(Ct,L t).
23additional intratemporal condition for the planning optimum is:
χ(Lt)
1
ϕ Ct = Zt (Nt)
1
θ−1 . (16)
The only diﬀerence between the planning optimum and the competitive market equilibrium
concerns the equations governing intratemporal substitution between consumption and leisure —
equations (16) and (15). Comparing these two equations shows that the two equilibria diﬀer as
follows. At the Pareto optimum, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure (χ(Lt)
1
ϕ Ct) is equal to the marginal rate at which hours and the consumption good can be
transformed into each other (Zt (Nt)
1
θ−1). In the competitive equilibrium this is no longer the case:
There is a wedge (equal to the reciprocal of the gross price markup) between these two objects that
can be explained intuitively as follows. Since consumption goods are priced at a markup and leisure
is not, the household is less willing than optimal to substitute from leisure into consumption. That
is, a suboptimally high amount of leisure is purchased, since this is the relatively cheaper good
(implying that hours worked and consumption are suboptimally low). This result conforms with
the argument in Lerner (1934, p. 172) that “If the ‘social’ degree of monopoly is the same for all
ﬁnal products [including leisure] there is no monopolistic alteration from the optimum at all.” The
absence of a markup (‘social’ degree of monopoly) for the leisure good induces non-synchronization
of relative prices which leads to an ineﬃcient allocation.
Eﬃciency can clearly be restored by taxing leisure (or subsidizing labor supply) at a rate equal
to the net markup in the pricing of consumption goods and applying a lump-sum transfer/tax to
the households. This policy ensures equality of markups, consistent with the Lerner-Samuelson
intuition described above (see the appendix for the proof). Note that while the same policy would
also induce eﬃciency in a model with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, there is an important diﬀerence
concerning optimal policy between that framework and our model. When N is ﬁxed, this policy is
equivalent to one that induces marginal-cost pricing of consumption goods by taxing ﬁrm revenues
(hence synchronizing relative prices).
This equivalence no longer holds in our framework with entry: Such a policy would remove
the wedge from equation (15), but no ﬁrm would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter (in the absence of
an additional entry subsidy) since there would be no proﬁt with which to cover the entry cost.
Therefore, while markup synchronization is necessary for eﬃciency, it is not suﬃcient.A b s e n ta n
entry cost subsidy, the suﬃcient condition states that the planner needs to align markups to the
24higher (positive) level. Doing otherwise (inducing marginal-cost pricing) would make the economy
stop producing altogether. This result highlights once more that monopoly power in itself is not
a distortion and should in fact be preserved if ﬁrm entry is subject to sunk costs that cannot be
entirely subsidized.
Solution
In what follows, we assume that the government does not have access to distortionary taxation of
leisure that removes the ineﬃciency of the market equilibrium. We focus on the ineﬃcient steady
state, comparing it to the eﬃcient one chosen by the planner, and we analyze ﬂuctuations around
this ineﬃcient point.37
The Steady State
The steady state analysis is largely unmodiﬁed by the introduction of elastic labor supply. Due
to the form of the assumed preferences, the shares derived in the exogenous labor supply case are
exactly the same. Importantly, since steady-state hours are constant to variations in productivity
and market regulation, the long-run elasticities to these shocks for the variable labor supply case
are exactly the same as in Table 2. In particular, marginal cost, w/Z, increases in response to a
long-run increase in productivity even when labor supply is endogenous. However, this equivalence
does not hold for government spending shocks. To illustrate this, we use the steady-state version












(Note that hours are indeed constant relative to variations in productivity and regulation.)
The planning optimum implies that the household supplies more labor eﬀo r tt h a ni nt h em a r k e t
equilibrium, consistent with the result that the latter becomes eﬃcient if the government is taxing












Using this, it is also possible to verify that the number of varieties N and consumption C are
37We return to the implications of leisure taxation in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2005).
25too small in the competitive steady state relative to the planning optimum. In the absence of a
leisure tax, undersupply of labor results in too little investment in the creation of new ﬁrms and
less consumption than optimal.
We can perform the same exercise as in Table 2, calculating the long-run elasticities of vari-
ables to a one percent permanent increase in the share of government spending Γ.I m p l i c i t l o g -
diﬀerentiation of (17) yields dlnL/dlnΓ = Γϕ/[(1 − Γ)(1+ϕ)]. This is a standard result in the
RBC framework: An increase in government spending has a negative wealth eﬀect due to taxation,
inducing the agent to work more (and more so, the more elastic is labor supply) as (s)he feels
eﬀectively poorer. From (10), note that the eﬀect on the steady-state number of ﬁr m si si d e n t i c a l
to the eﬀect on hours worked.
The elasticity of real wage w and marginal cost w/Z to Γ is dlnw/dlnΓ = Γϕ/[(θ − 1)(1 − Γ)(1+ϕ)].
Real wage and real marginal cost increase in response to government spending shocks.38 The in-
tuition for this result stems from entry dynamics. The wealth eﬀect on labor supply would lead
to a fall in the real wage and an increase in proﬁtability for a given number of ﬁrms. With entry,
however, proﬁt opportunities attract new entrants, and this leads to an increase in labor demand
such that the overall eﬀect on real wage and marginal cost is positive. The long-run eﬀect of Γ on
private consumption is dlnC/dlnΓ = Γ(1 + ϕ − θ)/[(θ − 1)(1 − Γ)(1+ϕ)].N o t e t h a t g o v e r n -
ment spending can crowd in private consumption if labor supply is elastic enough and the degree
of monopolistic distortion is high enough (θ low enough), namely if ϕ>θ−1. For such parameter
values, the eﬀect on the real wage is strong enough to compensate the negative wealth eﬀect of
taxation, as households substitute out of leisure and into consumption.
The crowding-in eﬀect of government spending on consumption described above is diﬀerent,
however, from the expansionary consumption eﬀect of government spending shocks estimated in
empirical studies (Blanchard and Perotti, 2003, and Perotti, 2004, among others). The reason is
that (real) consumption data reﬂect consumption deﬂated by the average price level CR,t ≡ Ct/ρt
more than the consumption index Ct that properly accounts for variety in all periods. To explain









38The elasticities of proﬁts and ﬁrm value are equal to that of the real wage.
39Since Γ ≡ G/Y
C,i ti sΓR = Γ,s ot h a tas h o c kt oΓ corresponds to an increase in empirically measured government
spending.
26Therefore, an increase in Γ — which induces L to rise — causes CR to decrease, in contrast with
the empirical evidence.40 Nevertheless, the welfare implications of government spending can be
crucially diﬀerent in our model from the standard RBC setup (which shares the same inability
to generate data-consistent crowding-in). In the standard RBC setup, an increase in wasteful
government spending crowds out consumption and lowers welfare. In our model, there can be
combinations of parameter values for which a higher Γ crowds out data-consistent consumption,
but welfare increases, as C rises enough to oﬀset the welfare-reducing eﬀect of increased labor eﬀort.
Dynamics
As in the previous section, we log-linearize the system to study dynamics in the neighborhood of
the steady state. We deﬁne a new parameter for analytical convenience, α ≡ ϕ[r + δ + δ/(θ − 1)],
where α is proportional to labor supply elasticity. Then,


























Compared to the ﬁxed-labor-supply case (12)-(13), elastic labor supply implies a higher absolute
value of the elasticities of number of ﬁrms producing at t+1to its lagged value, consumption, and
technology.
As in the inelastic-labor-supply case, the system (18)-(19) has a unique, non-explosive solution
(see the appendix for the proof). The solution takes exactly the same form as in the inelastic-
labor-supply case, with diﬀerent elasticities depending on the labor supply elasticity. As before,
the elasticity of the number of ﬁrms producing in period t +1to its past level (ηNN) is such that
0 <η NN < 1. It follows from the expression of ηCN in Table 4 that consumption is higher the
larger the number of ﬁrms producing in period t.
40Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2004) show that inclusion of “non-Ricardian” households who consume their
disposable income in each period would ameliorate this problem. See also Bilbiie and Straub (2004).
276 Business Cycles with Firm Dynamics, Part II
This section completes the exploration of the properties of our model for business cycle transmission
with ﬁrm dynamics by means of the numerical example we started exploring in Section 4. As in
that section, we set β = .99, γ =1 , δ = .025, θ =3 .8, and initial steady-state levels Z = fE =1
and G = Γ =0 . We consider the following alternative values for labor supply elasticity (in addition
to the inelastic case): ϕ =1 , 2, 4, 20.41 We set the weight of the disutility of labor in the period
utility function, χ, so that the steady-state level of labor eﬀort in (17) is 1 regardless of ϕ, ensuring
that the steady-state levels of all variables are the same as in the inelastic-labor case.42
Impulse Responses
Productivity
Figure 5 shows the responses (percent deviations from steady state) to a 1 percent permanent
increase in productivity under alternative scenarios for labor supply elasticity. The number of
years is on the horizontal axis. The round marker on the responses corresponds to inelastic labor
(as in Figure 3), the cross to ϕ =1 , the square to ϕ =2 , the pentagon to ϕ =4 , and the star to
ϕ =2 0 .
The responses of most variables with elastic labor are qualitatively very similar to the inelastic-
labor case. However, elastic labor implies that the household has an additional margin of adjustment
in the face of shocks. This enhances the model’s propagation mechanism and, as the ﬁgure shows,
ampliﬁes the impact responses of most endogenous variables with respect to the inelastic-labor
case. Faced with an increase in the real wage, the household optimally decides to work more hours
in order to attain a higher consumption level. Moreover, expectations of increased proﬁtability, as
before, make the household more willing to invest in new ﬁrms (and hence the impact responses of
labor in the investment sector and investment in new production lines are correspondingly larger as
labor supply becomes more elastic). This adds to the capital stock of the economy (the number of
ﬁrms) and makes both GDP and consumption increase more quickly toward the new steady state
as.ϕ increases. (The long-run responses are identical — independent of labor supply elasticity — and
are explained in Section 2.) Except in the initial quarters, ﬁrm-level proﬁts increase by less than
in the inelastic-labor case since proﬁt margins are eroded by the increased entry of new ﬁrms.
41We consider a very high value of ϕ for illustrative purposes. An inﬁnite elasticity of labor supply corresponds to
linear disutility of labor, as in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996b).
42This requires χ = 924271.
28Figure 6 repeats the exercise for a shock with persistence .9. Responses display the same
pattern, with labor supply elasticity amplifying the responses of most variables. Firm-level proﬁts
drop below the steady state during the transition, increasingly so as ϕ increases since more entry
erodes individual ﬁrm proﬁtability. However, aggregate real proﬁts (DR,t — omitted) increase in
procyclical fashion, the more so, the more elastic labor supply.
Deregulation
Figure 7 shows the responses to a 1 percent permanent deregulation shock. As for productivity, the
long-run responses are identical regardless of ϕ. However, the transitional dynamics are diﬀerent.
Consider ﬁrst the inelastic-labor case. Deregulation attracts new entrants and ﬁrm value decreases
(the relative price of the investment good falls). Since investment is relatively more attractive than
consumption, there is intersectoral labor reallocation from the latter to the former. Consumption
falls initially as households postpone consumption to invest more in ﬁrms whose productivity has
not increased. The number of ﬁrms starts increasing, but GDP initially falls as the decline in
consumption dominates the increase in investment. All variables then move monotonically towards
their steady-state values. In the endogenous labor case, while the mechanism above still applies, the
additional margin of adjustment induces the consumer to decide optimally to supply more labor
to both sectors and accommodate the extra labor demand generated by the increasing number
of ﬁrms. The number of entrants (and hence investment) increase relatively more, and, as for a
permanent productivity shock, the total number of ﬁrms, ﬁrm value, and the real wage all converge
faster to their new steady-state levels, the more so the larger labor supply elasticity. GDP now
increases, due to a larger increase in investment and a smaller decrease in consumption.
Government Spending
Figure 8 shows responses to a 1 percent permanent increase in government spending G.T h e
ﬁgure allows us to emphasize the important eﬀects of labor supply elasticity on the responses to
government spending shocks. In the inelastic-labor case, the only eﬀect of the shock is to crowd
out consumption one for one. When labor supply is elastic, the household responds to the shock
optimally by supplying more labor, which results in larger amounts of labor both in creation of
new ﬁrms and production of consumption (more so in the investment sector initially as households
front-load entry of new ﬁrms). Consequently, GDP increases, and consumption increases in the
long run if ϕ is suﬃciently large (and the short-run decrease in C becomes progressively smaller
29and shorter-lived as ϕ increases further).
Figure 9 repeats the exercise for a shock with persistence .9. This makes it possible to further
highlight the consequences of labor supply elasticity. A persistent government spending shock
has a negative wealth eﬀect on the consumer. With inelastic labor supply, as a larger present
discounted value of taxes induces the consumer to feel poorer, (s)he decreases both consumption
and investment. The relative magnitude of the responses is dictated by the relative price of the
investment good (the value of a ﬁrm). Since this is expected to fall, the household allocates relatively
more hours out of the ﬁxed labor endowment to the consumption sector. But since the number
of entrants falls below the steady state, the capital stock of the economy is depleted (the total
number of ﬁrms falls) and total demand for labor also falls inducing a lower real wage. When labor
supply is suﬃciently elastic, most responses have the opposite sign. The wealth eﬀect is optimally
accommodated largely through labor supply: The consumer decides to work more for a given real
wage. Since ﬁrm value is expected to increase, much of the impact increase in hours goes to labor
in the investment sector, and hence both investment (the number of entrants) and the number
of ﬁrms increase. After the initial period, larger labor demand generates an increase in the real
wage. For high enough elasticity of labor supply, this generates an increase in consumption after
the impact response (since the consumer substitutes out of leisure and into consumption). When
the relative price of investment is at its peak, the consumer optimally decides to restrain investment
and the number of new entrants falls under the steady state. The extra labor is relocated to the
consumption sector, and the transition to the steady state is monotonic thereafter.
[TO BE COMPLETED.]
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33Table 1. Benchmark Model, Summary




Proﬁts dt = 1
θ (ρt)
1−θ (Ct + Gt)
Free entry vt = wt
fE,t
Zt
Number of ﬁrms Nt =( 1− δ)(Nt−1 + NE,t−1)
Euler equation (bonds) (Ct)











Aggregate accounting Ct + Gt + NE,tvt = wtL + Ntdt





Table 2. Benchmark Model, Long-Run Elasticities
Elasticity of ⇓ w.r.t. ⇒ Zf E Γ












34Table 3. Benchmark Model, Log-Linear Solution



































ηNG = −(θ − 1)(r + δ)(1+ηCG)
Table 4. Variable Labor Model, Log-Linear Solution


















































ηNG = −(θ − 1)[(r + δ)(1+ηCG)+αηCG]
35Growth Rates of Real GDP, Net Entry, and Real Profits
Sample period: 1947 - 1998
Net Entry Real GDP (right axis)
Panel 1: Real GDP and Net Entry











Real Profits Real GDP
Panel 2: Real GDP and Real Profits













Real Profits Net Entry
Panel 3: Real Profits and Net Entry






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. Permanent productivity shock, increasing labor supply elasticity 
 
Legend: The round marker on the responses corresponds to inelastic labor, the cross to φ = 1, the 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6. Productivity shock, persistence .9, increasing labor supply elasticity 
 
Legend: The round marker on the responses corresponds to inelastic labor, the cross to φ = 1, the 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7. Permanent deregulation, increasing labor supply elasticity 
 
Legend: The round marker on the responses corresponds to inelastic labor, the cross to φ = 1, the 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8. Permanent government spending shock, increasing labor supply elasticity 
 
Legend: The round marker on the responses corresponds to inelastic labor, the cross to φ = 1, the 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9. Government spending shock, persistence .9, increasing labor supply elasticity 
 
Legend: The round marker on the responses corresponds to inelastic labor, the cross to φ = 1, the 
square to φ = 2, the pentagon to φ = 4, and the star to φ = 20 Appendix
The Benchmark Model
Equilibrium Eﬃciency


































































































































A-1Using equation (6) and rearranging yields equation (5). (Recall that we are abstracting from
government spending.) Together with













this implies that the planning optimum coincides with the competitive equilibrium.
Local Equilibrium Determinacy and Non-Explosiveness
To analyze local determinacy and non-explosiveness of the rational expectation equilibrium, we can






























Existence of a unique, non-explosive rational expectations equilibrium requires that one eigenvalue
of M be inside and one outside the unit circle. Since the determinant det(M)=1+r is also
the product of the eigenvalues and is strictly greater than one, at least one of the roots will lie
outside the unit circle; hence, equilibrium indeterminacy is never a problem in our model. The










The condition for existence of a unique, non-explosive rational expectations equilibrium is then
J (−1)J (1) < 0. It is straightforward to verify that: (i) J (1) = 1−trace(M) + det(M) < 0 if
γ>(r+δ)/(1+r) as is the case for all reasonable parametrizations; (ii) if J (1) < 0, then J (−1) > 0.
This proves determinacy and non-explosiveness of the rational expectations equilibrium. Since
J (0) > 0, we can also conclude that both roots are positive. The elasticity of the number of ﬁrms
producing in period t+1to its past level (ηNN) in the solution of the model is then the stable root









Restoring Eﬃciency through a Leisure Tax
Suppose the government taxes leisure at the rate τ. In equilibrium, revenues from taxation of
leisure are rebated to households through lump-sum transfers TLE
t . The representative household’s
budget constraint becomes:
Bt+1 + vtNH,txt+1 + Ct + Tt + TLE
t =( 1+rt)Bt +( dt + vt)Ntxt + wtLt − τwt
¡¯ L − Lt
¢
,
where ¯ L is the endowment of time in each period.
The ﬁrst-order condition for the household’s optimal choice of labor supply is the only equilib-
rium condition that is aﬀected. It becomes:
χ(Lt)
1
ϕ Ct =( 1+τ)wt.











Comparing this equation to (16) shows that a constant rate of taxation equal to the net markup
of price over marginal cost (τ =1 /(θ − 1)) restores eﬃciency of the market equilibrium.
Local Equilibrium Determinacy and Non-Explosiveness




















(1 + r + α)
−(θ − 1)(r + δ + α)1 + r + α

.
The conditions for existence and uniqueness of a stable rational expectations equilibrium are the








A-3Since J (1) = −(r + δ)[δ +( θ − 1)(r + δ + α)]/(1 − δ) < 0 and J (−1) = 4+2r−J (1) > 0, there
exists a unique, stable rational expectations equilibrium for any possible parametrization. Note
that, since J (0) > 0,b o t hr o o t so fM are positive. As with inelastic labor supply, the elasticity of









Taste for Variety and Monopoly Power
In our model, the same parameter 1/(θ − 1) governs the degree of monopoly power and con-
sumer preference for variety. We verify that eﬃciency of the market equilibrium breaks down
if we separate monopoly power and taste for variety in consumer preferences.42 (We focus on
the case of inelastic labor supply.) We disentangle monopoly power and taste for variety in ad








,w h e r eξ now measures preference for variety and can
be parametrized separately. When ξ =1 /(θ − 1), we return to our benchmark.
Competitive Equilibrium
As before, we omit government spending. Many of the equations remain unchanged.
The relative price is now ρt = pt/Pt =( Nt)
ξ, while prices are still set as a markup θ/(θ − 1) over
marginal cost. The only equation in Table 1 that changes is the expression for proﬁts. Proﬁtf o re a c h
ﬁrm is still given by dt = Ct/(θNt).43 However, using ρt =( Nt)
ξ,w en o wh a v edt =( ρt)
−1
ξ Ct/θ
instead of dt =( ρt)
1−θ Ct/θ.
Performing the same exercise as in the main text to obtain a two-equation system, we get:


























42Kim (2004) obtains the same result in his model.
43Since dt = ρtZtlt − wtlt = ρtlt/θ,s ot h a tNtdt = ρtNtlt/θ = Ct/θ.
A-4Planning Optimum
The planner’s problem is the same as before, except the planner’s constraint is now Ct = Zt (Nt)
ξ LC
t .






























This gives the Euler equation:
(Ct)
−γ (Nt)













which is again the same as in the competitive equilibrium.
However, note that the dynamic constraint











is now diﬀerent and coincides with the competitive one if and only if ξ =1 /(θ − 1).
In order to gain some further intuition we focus on the steady state. The number of ﬁrms in
the planning optimum and the competitive equilibrium is determined respectively by:
NP =
(1 − δ)L
δ +( θ − 1)(r + δ)
,N C =
(1 − δ)L
δ +( θ − 1)(r + δ)(NC)
1+ξ(1−θ).
Direct comparison shows that (since N>1) NP > (<)NC i fa n do n l yi fξ<(>)1/(θ − 1). When
ξ<1/(θ − 1) the consumer derives disutility from the introduction of a new good and the economy
ends up in the long run with too low a number of producers. However, as noted in the text, these
preferences imply that the consumer is made worse oﬀ by the introduction of the good even if (s)he
never consumes it. This induces us to adopt the C.E.S. speciﬁcation as our benchmark.
A-5Technical Appendix
A Solution, Log-Linear Inelastic-Labor Model
The system to be solved is:

































The canonical form of the model can be written as:
Nt+1 = bNNNt + bNCCt + bNffE,t + bNZZt + bNGGt,
Et(Ct+1)=dCCCt + dCNNt + dCZZt + bCffE,t + dCGGt,
where:
bNN ≡ 1+r,
bNC ≡− (θ − 1)(r + δ),
bNZ ≡ [(θ − 1)(r + δ)+δ],
bNf ≡− δ,




































































and ζ ≡ 1−δ
γ(1+r)−(r+δ).
TA-1The solution of the model be written as:
Nt+1 = ηNNNt + ηNZZt + ηNfEfE,t + ηNGGt,
Ct = ηCNNt + ηCZZt + ηCfEfE,t + ηCGGt.
The elasticities η are found with the method of undetermined coeﬃcients as follows:














ηNN − bNN + φS − dCC
,
ηNS = bNCηCS + bNS =
bNCdCS + bNS(φS − dCC)
ηNN − bNN + φS − dCC
.
B Solution, Log-Linear Elastic-Labor Model







+ r + δ
¶¸
Nt − {(θ − 1)(r + δ)+ϕ[(θ − 1)(r + δ)+δ]}Ct−
























The canonical form of the model can be written as:
Nt+1 = bNNNt + bNCCt + bNffE,t + bNZZt + bNGGt,
Et (Ct+1)=dCCCt + dCNNt + dCZZt + dCffE,t + dCGGt,
TA-2where:
bNN ≡ 1+r + α,
bNC ≡−(θ − 1)(r + δ + α),
bNZ ≡ [(θ − 1)(r + δ + α)+δ],
bNf ≡− δ,

























































The solution of the model can be written as:
Nt+1 = ηNNNt + ηNZZt + ηNfEfE,t + ηNGGt,
Ct = ηCNNt + ηCZZt + ηCfEfE,t + ηCGGt.
The elasticities η are found with the method of undetermined coeﬃcients as follows:










For any S ∈ {Z,G,fE} :
ηCS =
dCS + bNS
bNC (bNN − ηNN)
ηNN − bNN + φS − dCC
,
ηNS = bNCηCS + bNS =
bNCdCS + bNS(φS − dCC)
ηNN − bNN + φS − dCC
.
TA-3